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Introduction
 Rootkits:
– Stealth
– Isolated
–     ring 3  (user space)
→ ring 0  (kernel space) 
→ “ring -1” (hypervisor/VMM)
→ “ring -2” (System Management Mode)
→ “ring -3” (Intel Active Management 
                Technology)
 No ring -3 in hardware → “ring -3”
 Illustration: following the x86 ring protection model
 “Ring -3” rootkits related to modern x86 platforms
Memory Controller Hub, Serial Peripheral Interface Chip,
“A Quest to Ring -3“ (cf. [Ter09])
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Manageability
Engine
“Ring -3” Execution Environment (1/2)
(G)MCH (Northbridge)
Embedded µController
ARC4 Core
(32 bit)
SRAM
ROM
DMA
Out-of-band
communication
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“Ring -3” Execution Environment (2/2)
 Isolated execution environment implemented using an 
embedded µController
 Own flash memory storing:
– µKernel
– Drivers
– Services
– Applications
 Still working when platform powered down
 Active when turned off in BIOS
 More powerful than hypervisor or system management mode 
(SMM) based rootkits
 Actually intended for active platform management 
(cf. [Kum09])
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Our “Ring -3” Rootkit (1/3)
 USB Keystroke Logger for Linux operating system
– Finds keyboard buffer
– Monitors keyboard buffer constantly in background
– Sends logged keystroke codes to external platform
(G)MCH (Northbridge)
Management Engine
(embedded µController)
ARC4 Core SRAM
ROM
DDR2
Keystroke Logger
000110100010011
111001011010011
000110100010011
111001011010011
000110100010011
111001011010011
000110100010011
111001011010011
000110100010011
111001011010011
000110100010011
111001011010011
000110100010011
111001011010011
000110100010011
DMA
0001101000100111110
0011010001001111101
1101000100111110111
0011010001001111101
Keystroke Logger executed in Isolated Execution Environment
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Our “Ring -3” Rootkit (2/3)
USB Human Interface Device Structures in Host Memory
(cf. /usr/src/linux-source-2.6.31/include/linux/usb.h)
struct usb_device {
...
/* static strings from the device */
char *product;
char *manufacturer;
char *serial;
...
};
...
struct urb {
... 
struct usb_device *dev; /* (in) pointer to associated device */
...
dma_addr_t transfer_dma;
...
};
“USB Keyboard“12
3
4
 Computer forensic (find USB keyboard buffer)
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Our “Ring -3” Rootkit (3/3)
 Why not evaluating “ring -3” rootkit provided by [Ter09] ?
[Ter09] POC USB Keylogger
Prototype
[Ter09] POC Rootkit compared to our USB Keylogger Prototype
Reveals itself
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Target Platform Infiltration
 No Intel developer board providing
“ring -3” (and JTAG support, cf. [Bul08])
Board Features (cf. [Int07], p.11)
ITP-XDP Connector location (J2BC)
(cf. [Int07], p.20)
Let's Program DMA Manually (cf. [Bul08], p.13)
We use exploit discovered by [Ter09]
(cf. last slide)
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Exfiltration of Collected Data
 Data collected by USB Keystroke Logger placed in a network 
packet
– In our case DHCP discover
– Sent via iAMT's OOB communication (invisible for host)
Logged bytes from
keyboard buffer
0x04: character 'a'0x02: left shift key
Captured Network Packet containing
Bytes from Keyboard Buffer
Keystroke Logger Demo:
Online Banking Sign On
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Summary
 Stealth USB Keystroke Logger
– Isolated from host environment → AV software unable to 
find keystroke logger
 Monitors Linux OS (currently ported to Windows OS)
– Finds keyboard buffer
– Collects keystroke codes
– Exfiltrates keystroke codes via isolated network channel
 Current prototype can be detect using second platform
– See future work ...
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Future Work
 Detection Mechanism for Host Platform
– [Ter09] discussed countermeasures, but
• Also provide approaches to defeat 
countermeasures (cf. virtual CDROM)
– First detection approaches:
• Provoke deleays when accessing same resources:
– Memory ?
– Network ?
– Bus Master ?
 Evaluate Windows version of our keystroke logger
 Implementation of covert timing channel (e.g., JitterBug)
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